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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 2nd meeting
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 22 April 2013, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Feruta ..... (Romania)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Martin** (Switzerland) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been essential in protecting humanity from such weapons, but now faced many challenges. Many of its commitments had been only partially met and progress across its pillars was uneven, particularly in the implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties.

2. While advances had been made in non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, progress in disarmament was negligible. If tangible results were not achieved that regard by the start of the third session of the Committee in 2014, the credibility of Treaty itself would be called into question.

3. His delegation therefore called on the nuclear-weapon States to participate in disarmament efforts, as they had done at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo in March 2013. States parties should also participate in the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament established under General Assembly resolution 67/56, and in the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament to be held on 26 September 2013.

4. Heightened tensions arising from the proliferation activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea underscored the need for a solid and universal non-proliferation system. His Government called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to respect its international obligations and on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rejoin the Treaty's non-proliferation system.

5. The comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the additional protocols thereto should become the standard for safeguards. His Government therefore supported IAEA efforts to establish a less mechanical safeguards system which better accommodated the specific characteristics of each State. It had launched initiatives to help the Agency focus its work where it was most needed, and called on all States to lend their support to that end.

6. His Government regretted the postponement of the proposed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which had been scheduled for 2012. The arguments against the establishment of such a zone were unconvincing, particularly in view of concerns over the possible use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. His Government therefore called on the States of the region to engage in dialogue with one another and on the sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty to act with more resolve in fulfilling their obligations.

7. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant which occurred in Japan in 2011 confirmed the need for a policy which made nuclear safety an absolute requirement. His Government had therefore called for more binding commitments during the September 2011 talks on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. The peer review system should be strengthened through more regular inspections to reduce the likelihood of such accidents. He urged all States parties to implement the IAEA Action Plan and the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

8. Lastly, his Government had submitted its report on the implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and urged other States parties to do likewise.

9. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia) said that the States parties should focus on implementing the 2010 action plan, which contained measures aimed at achieving the Treaty's goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In that connection, his Government had joined nine other non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which had submitted seven working papers to the current session dealing with the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons; non-strategic nuclear weapons; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); export controls; negative security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones; disarmament education; and the wider application of safeguards.

10. While nuclear-weapon States were making commendable efforts to meet their disarmament commitments, they needed to do more to eliminate nuclear weapons in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner, and to reduce the importance of such weapons in their declaratory policies. They should

also agree on a standard reporting form to promote greater transparency, in line with action 21 of the 2010 action plan.

11. His Government regretted the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to open negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which was essential to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for such weapons.

12. The General Assembly had expressed its concerns in that regards by adopting resolution 67/53, which had established a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and resolution 67/56, which had established an open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament. His Government supported both resolutions, and would participate not only in the working group but also in the preparatory work for the group of governmental experts, in order to support implementation of the 2010 action plan and bring fresh impetus to the work of the Conference.

13. His Government welcomed the ratification of the CTBT by Chad and Brunei Darussalam, but was deeply disappointed that the CTBT had still not entered into force. It urged the remaining annex 2 States to ratify the CTBT without delay so that it could enter into force, pending which all nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on testing. His Government was concerned by the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, as discussed at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo in March 2013, and welcomed the offer of the Mexican Government to convene a follow-up conference on the issue.

14. Although States had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such use must be underpinned by safeguards to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. His Government advocated the adoption of additional protocols to safeguards agreements between States parties and IAEA. It had made contact with States which had not yet concluded such protocols and was ready to assist with their implementation.

15. His Government regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and called on States in the region to work with the facilitator to ensure that one was convened as soon as possible.

16. His Government condemned the rocket launch conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 December 2012 and the nuclear test it carried out on 12 February 2013, in violation of not only Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), but also the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the CTBT. It called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease its provocations and abide by its international commitments. He also called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully and unconditionally with IAEA and engage with the international community to establish confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

17. **Mr. Román-Morey** (Peru) said that, with recent tensions threatening to lead to war, implementation of the Treaty was essential. Nuclear disarmament was a common goal which nuclear-weapon States were primarily responsible for achieving. Despite the commendable efforts made by those States in that regard, more concrete and verifiable actions were required. States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty should be encouraged to do so, since universal accession would facilitate the pursuit of a common objective. He urged all States that had not yet ratified the CTBT, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, to do so, for the CTBT to enter into force. Pending such ratification, States should refrain from nuclear testing.

18. Given that the Treaty contained no provisions to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear technology, his Government supported proposals for increasing the security of nuclear materials and facilities through compliance with and strengthening of international instruments, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), development of detection and investigation capacities, greater information exchange among States, and effective verification.

19. The IAEA safeguards regime should be enhanced and all States should adopt the Agency's Model Additional Protocol, which should be continuously updated and strengthened. IAEA itself should be bolstered and its regular budget increased to allow for medium- and long-term activity planning, the enhancement of its safeguards system and the expansion of its technical cooperation.

20. With regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the resources of the technical cooperation programme of IAEA must be increased, assured, predictable and sufficient, to allow it to help developing countries develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Through its cooperation with IAEA, his Government was developing nuclear energy for activities in key sectors, such as the use of X-rays in large infrastructure projects and irradiation to preserve and sterilize fruits and vegetables and combat cancer. It would consider, within the IAEA framework, proposals to ensure the secure supply of nuclear fuel, including through the multilateral management of fuel banks, with a view to establishing non-discriminatory mechanisms in line with the Treaty.

21. As a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, Peru believed that measures were needed to enhance cooperation between nuclear-weapon-free zones and thus bolster the NPT regime. It regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012, as proposed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Such a conference should be organized as soon as possible.

22. The right of States to withdraw from a treaty was recognized by international legal instruments, in particular the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Nonetheless, his Government was concerned by the behaviour of certain States which had developed nuclear technology on the pretext that they would use it peacefully, but had then withdrawn from the Treaty, ignoring their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament.

23. Since the Treaty had global implications for international security in various areas, including the environment, terrorism, accident prevention and management, and the handling of nuclear materials, the outcomes of the review process would also have global repercussions. His Government remained committed to that process.

24. **Ms. Tan** Yee Woan (Singapore) said that the Treaty regime was under strain: some nuclear-weapon States refused to accede to the Treaty; one State party had withdrawn from the Treaty but maintained its nuclear weapons; some States parties were acquiring nuclear weapons technology or transferring material or expertise to States that were not Parties to the Treaty. Nonetheless, the NPT remained the only near-universal non-proliferation regime available.

25. With regard to nuclear disarmament, much remained to be done for nuclear-weapon States to reassure non-nuclear-weapon States that they were meeting their commitments under article VI of the Treaty. Her delegation regretted the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a work programme and the impasse over the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The CTBT remained essential to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its entry into force was overdue. Her Government welcomed its ratification by Chad and Brunei Darussalam and urged all States, in particular the annex 2 States, to ratify it.

26. Singapore encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to sign the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone without reservations and supported the establishment of other similar zones elsewhere. It regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and hoped that all relevant parties would work towards the convening of such a conference.

27. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were two sides of the same coin. In that connection, her Government called on States parties yet to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol to do so, in order to reassure the international community that their nuclear activities were intended for peaceful uses. It urged States to comply with their international obligations, and called in particular on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with Security Council and IAEA resolutions and accede to the Treaty, and on the Islamic Republic of Iran to address international concerns about its nuclear programme.

28. All States should act to counter the illicit trafficking of materials and technology in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. An approach which took account of the entire supply chain was needed to ensure that the system was robust but did not hamper legitimate trade. Her Government had been the first in the Southeast Asia region to establish an export control regime, had participated in international information exchange forums, and worked with the Proliferation Security Initiative to strengthen non-proliferation.

29. Her Government supported the right of all countries to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology under article IV of the Treaty, on the condition that they met the responsibilities which came with that right and provided assurances that their nuclear programmes were intended for peaceful ends. All actors in the nuclear industry must maintain the highest safety and security standards to ensure the sustainability of nuclear power.

30. **Mr. Meriç** (Turkey) said that the international community's ability to meet challenges to peace and security depended on its making the best use of forums such as the Treaty review process. His Government was committed to the eradication of nuclear weapons and its security policies excluded the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. Turkey was party to all international non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes and supported their universalization. It was committed to implementation of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was developing its own nuclear energy programme and believed that States in compliance with their international obligations should benefit from such energy. Non-proliferation measures should not hinder cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. That was crucial for Turkey, which needed nuclear power to meet its growing energy demands.

31. The atmosphere following the 2010 Review Conference had been positive, with the adoption of the action plan; the entry into force of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the new START Treaty); and progress made in securing radioactive materials through the Nuclear Security Summit process. However, 2013 was a year of challenges. Nuclear proliferation was a threat, and striking a balance between disarmament and non-proliferation would prove difficult. The Treaty mechanism should therefore be strengthened and revitalized.

32. His delegation called on the nuclear-weapon States to irreversibly reduce their stockpiles in accordance with article VI, eliminate such weapons from their military doctrines, and accede to treaties establishing zones free of such weapons. His Government regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East in 2012 and hoped that the conference would take place as soon as possible.

33. To be sustainable, the Treaty should be ratified by all States; the IAEA safeguards system should be strengthened; export controls should be enhanced; the CTBT should enter into force early; negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should be resumed; and concerns regarding non-proliferation should be resolved through diplomacy. Work of the Conference on Disarmament should resume and a programme of work should be adopted.

34. The international community should monitor the risk of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear-weapon explosion. States should engage in cooperation and dialogue for a better future. Global peace and security would be achieved through a common vision and interdependence rather than through the nuclear deterrent.

35. **Mr. Seilenthal** (Estonia) said that, although the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty in March 2013 had increased confidence in multilateralism, the non-proliferation regime was facing challenges. His delegation condemned the conducting of a nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in February 2013, in violation of Security Council resolutions, and called on it to refrain from further provocation. Although States parties had the right to withdraw from the Treaty under its article X, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had done, they should not violate the Treaty before withdrawing from it. The 2015 review cycle was an opportunity for the international community to address the abuse of article X.

36. His Government regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012 and called on all the relevant stakeholders to facilitate the holding of such a conference. Article VI of the Treaty was a good basis for the establishment of the rule of law in the area of disarmament. Greater transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and trust among the nuclear-weapon States were needed to eliminate nuclear weapons without jeopardizing security.

37. His delegation noted the progress made in the implementation of the new START Treaty and welcomed the work on a pact between the United

States and the Russian Federation to reduce the number of weapons not yet covered by an agreement. It regretted the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a work programme, which hampered implementation of article VI of the Treaty. Pending the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, States should establish a voluntary moratorium on the production of weapons-grade fissile material. He called on the remaining annex 2 States to ratify the CTBT and enable its entry into force.

38. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the progress made in export control, which ensured that nuclear trading for peaceful purposes did not contribute to proliferation. He urged States to use multilaterally agreed guidelines to develop their national export controls.

39. **Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) said that his Government's priority was to ensure that the Treaty was consolidated through the implementation of the 2010 action plan. The Islamic Republic of Iran was continuing to breach Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and had not followed up on the proposals made by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, the Russian Federation and China (the E3+3) at their February 2013 talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The Islamic Republic of Iran must take concrete steps to ensure that the crisis was resolved diplomatically.

40. The December 2012 long-range missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the threats made by that country against the Republic of Korea, Japan and the United States were unacceptable. The international community should remain vigilant and keep the pressure on that country. His Government also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to be transparent with regard to its past or current nuclear activities.

41. With regard to nuclear disarmament, France would continue to fulfil its responsibilities as a nuclear-weapon State. It had reduced the airborne component of its deterrent by one third in 2012, cut its arsenal by half over the preceding twenty years, dismantled its land-based weapons, reduced its seaborne deterrent by one third, been transparent about the number of its warheads, and dismantled its test site and fissile material production facilities unilaterally, fully and irreversibly. It had attended high-level meetings with the other nuclear-weapon States with a view to strengthening trust, harmonizing nuclear terminology and enhancing verification, transparency and reporting.

42. His Government was a party to the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). It had signed parallel declarations in September 2012 recognizing the nuclear-free status of Mongolia, and hoped that the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone would be signed as soon as possible. It would also resume consultations for the ratification of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

43. In an effort to achieve progress in the multilateral arena on a fissile material cut-off treaty, his Government supported General Assembly resolution 67/53, would contribute to the report of the Secretary-General on the matter, and called on all States parties to do likewise.

44. All States complying fully with their international obligations and carried out their nuclear activities in good faith for civilian purposes should be able to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Following the Fukushima accident, additional vigilance was needed. His Government was committed to the safe and environmentally friendly development of nuclear power for civilian uses. The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety should be implemented and the international frameworks for transparency, peer review, the improvement of rapid accident response mechanisms and the enhancement of international civil nuclear responsibility should be strengthened.

45. His Government remained committed to the Nuclear Security Summit process and had recently ratified the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The States parties should make every effort to ensure that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was held as soon as possible.

46. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand) said that the Treaty's three pillars — nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — should be implemented in a balanced and transparent manner. More work was needed to fulfil the promise of the

undertakings on nuclear disarmament made in 2010, especially those set out under action 5 contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo in 2012 and the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament had allowed the international community to make progress towards the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

47. Her Government was committed to the Treaty and its Review Conferences. It regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012, and hoped that the conference would be convened soon. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

48. Her Government was committed to the safeguards system and believed that States parties had a duty not only to fulfil their obligations in under the system, but also to address all safeguards compliance issues wherever they arose. It called on the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran to take concrete steps to resolve the international community's concerns about the non-compliance with their safeguards obligations.

49. The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes brought with it the obligation to guarantee safety and security. Her Government's support for the Nuclear Security Summit process and the work of IAEA reflected its commitment to that principle.

50. **Mr. Kitano** (Japan) said that the urgency of the Committee's work had been emphasized by the February 2013 nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea despite international calls for it to refrain from provocation, thereby undermining regional and international peace and security. In order to meet such challenges, the three pillars of the Treaty should be implemented in a balanced manner. His Government therefore welcomed Security Council resolution 2094 (2013), which strengthened sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

51. His Government was also working within the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to reduce nuclear risk, maintain political momentum and advance disarmament and non-proliferation. It hoped that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be convened soon.

52. As the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks, Japan had contributed actively to the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons; continued to promote education about the consequences of such attacks, including through its "special communicators for a world without nuclear weapons" programme, which allowed survivors of the 1945 nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to share their experiences with international audiences. The youth were also able to share their knowledge of the effects of nuclear attacks and their opinions on the elimination of such weapons through the "youth communicators for a world without nuclear weapons" programme.

53. The measures contained in the 2010 action plan related to the CTBT, a fissile material cut-off treaty and the further reduction of nuclear arsenals should be implemented to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack and its humanitarian consequences. The right of States parties to use nuclear energy peacefully depended on their fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations and ensuring nuclear safety and security. The IAEA safeguards regime therefore needed to be strengthened through the universal adoption of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols thereto.

54. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the continued retention of nuclear weapons served as a catalyst for further proliferation. Despite the agreement reached on the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, which provided renewed hope for the achievement of the Treaty's overall objectives, there were still misgivings about the implementation of past agreements. Most States parties to the Treaty were seriously concerned about a lack of urgency and seriousness in the approach to nuclear disarmament and the possible reinterpretation by some States parties of the agreements reached at previous Review Conferences, seriously undermining the Treaty regime.

55. Apart from modest gains in reducing the number of strategically deployed nuclear weapons in the context of the new START Treaty, little concrete progress had been achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament since 2010. The development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems confirmed the continued wish of some States

to retain such weaponry indefinitely, contrary to their legal obligations and political commitments. Continued reliance on nuclear weapons had led to increased insecurity among non-nuclear-weapon States. The provision of effective, legally binding security assurances was therefore a key element of the Treaty.

56. States parties had an obligation to conclude safeguards agreements as required under the Treaty. Additional protocols to safeguards agreements between States and IAEA were indispensable instruments enabling the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It was encouraging that since 2010, additional States had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

57. His Government strongly condemned the latest nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called on that country to verifiably dismantle all its nuclear weapons; return to the Treaty without delay; place all its facilities under comprehensive IAEA verification; and help to strengthen confidence in global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. His Government also advocated a peaceful resolution of the dispute surrounding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and strongly rejected any threats of military intervention.

58. The inalienable right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear technology was of particular relevance to Africa, given its need for adequate energy supplies to fuel sustainable and accelerated economic growth. His own Government was promoting economic growth and development by investing in energy infrastructure; expanding access to affordable energy services; reducing pollution; and mitigating the effects of climate change. Nonetheless, it supported full implementation of the Treaty and its universality in pursuit of the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

59. **Mr. Carle** (International Atomic Energy Agency) said that there were currently 437 operating nuclear power reactors in 30 countries. In 2012, nuclear power had provided 12.3 per cent of the world's electricity and by 2030, nuclear generating capacity would grow by between 23 per cent and 100 per cent, with most growth in countries that already had operating nuclear power plants. The IAEA International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the Twenty-First Century would take place in June 2013 in the Russian Federation.

60. The Agency had continued work on the low enriched uranium bank project and had carried out technical missions in Kazakhstan in that regard. Since the Fukushima accident, it had expanded its programme of expert peer reviews that assessed the operational safety of a country's nuclear power plants and the effectiveness of its regulatory system, emergency preparedness and response arrangements. In 2012, it had trained some 2,000 people on all aspects of nuclear security, conducted nine peer review missions and donated over 200 detection instruments to States.

61. IAEA was delivering support to over 120 countries, working closely with recipient countries and partners such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The Agency was focusing increasingly on multi-country projects dealing with transboundary issues. In 2012, food-related nuclear applications had been the object of special attention. IAEA planned to construct a cancer diagnosis and treatment training centre and was collaborating with international organizations dedicated to preserving the marine environment while improving awareness of threats under different climate scenarios.

62. Seven non-nuclear-weapon States had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency since May 2010, but 13 non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty had yet to do so. The total number of States that had concluded additional protocols was 119, with 21 having done so since May 2010. While that was encouraging, the Agency still called on all States to adopt additional protocols as soon as possible.

63. Since 1993, the Agency had been unable to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the safeguards agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Since late 2002, the Agency had been largely unable to implement any verification measures in that country. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but because it was not receiving the necessary cooperation, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear

material and activities in that country. The Agency had concluded in 2011 that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in the Syrian Arab Republic in September 2007 had probably been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency.

64. **Ms. Adamson** (United Kingdom) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should be at the centre of the international non-proliferation architecture, continued to face challenges and pressures, including the nuclear ambitions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the risk of nuclear terrorist attack, and the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. The Treaty should therefore be strengthened across its three pillars.

65. The task moving forward would be to establish confidence and understanding between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States; create conditions conducive to further nuclear disarmament; respond to withdrawal from and non-compliance with the Treaty; and remove incentives and opportunities for proliferation, while protecting the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

66. The United Kingdom had been contributing to disarmament through its work on verification and transparency and was committed to strengthening the non-proliferation architecture; combating programmes of concern; encouraging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and promoting safe nuclear energy in line with article IV rights.

67. **Mr. Uliyanov** (Russian Federation) said that the unilateral and unauthorized decision taken by the convenors to postpone the proposed conference on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was regrettable. New dates for that conference must be set immediately, and a preparatory conference with all Middle Eastern countries participating should take place in the near future.

68. His Government had ratified protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and supported the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, whose legal status must be finalized in 2013. It had also completed all internal procedures for accession to the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and considered it ready for signature by nuclear-weapon States.

69. IAEA safeguards must be implemented more effectively, albeit with complete objectivity. While his Government fully supported universalization of additional protocols to safeguards agreements, accession to such protocol was a voluntary matter. In connection with the nuclear accident at Fukushima, it had proposed a number of initiatives to improve international legal norms for ensuring safety at nuclear energy facilities. Those proposals should be adopted as soon as possible.

70. In 2012, the Russian Federation and the United States had continued working actively to implement the new START Treaty. Work on nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must continue, with absolutely all nuclear-weapon States participating. Article VI called on all States parties, not only nuclear-weapon States, to participate in the process to achieve universal and comprehensive disarmament, a fact that was frequently overlooked.

71. **Ms. Rodríguez Camejo** (Cuba) said that a legally binding international instrument completely banning nuclear weapons was needed. In that regard, article VI of the Treaty was of particular relevance, as it outlined the commitment of States parties to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, some nuclear-weapon States lacked the political will to implement the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, as well as the action plan adopted in 2010, thus hampering progress towards an international nuclear disarmament convention.

72. The main nuclear-Power, through its application of a double standard, and some Western countries, through their complicit silence, were undermining the objective of nuclear disarmament. While demonizing certain countries for their supposed violations of the non-proliferation regime, they were stockpiling and transferring technologies to boost the nuclear arsenals of States that had not signed the Treaty, in clear violation of article I of the Treaty.

73. As a strong supporter of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, her Government regretted the failure to convene a conference to that effect in 2012 and hoped that one would be convened as soon as possible. Article IV of the Treaty, which set forth the inalienable right of all States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful

uses, was being manipulated for political purposes. Unilateral measures implemented by certain countries were cause for concern, as was Security Council interference in matters that were, according to the Treaty, within the competence of IAEA.

74. Non-nuclear-weapon States needed assurances from nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on assurances should therefore be adopted in the interest of non-nuclear-weapon States. Unilateral declarations and nuclear-weapon-free zones were insufficient, uncertain and legally weak means to that end.

75. Lastly, in September 2013, the General Assembly would hold its first high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament, pursuant to a resolution introduced by Cuba and supported by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. She hoped that the meeting would mark a concrete step forward on the path to nuclear disarmament.

76. **Mr. Pang** Sen (China) said that the consensus on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was gaining greater strength. However, the international security situation was laden with growing uncertainties and threats. China was ready to join other States parties to maintain strong momentum in the review process. Nuclear-weapon States should abandon the nuclear deterrence doctrine and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals bore special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should continue to make substantial, verifiable and irreversible reductions in their nuclear arsenals. The development of missile defence systems should be abandoned and efforts should be made to promote the non-weaponization of outer space.

77. Nuclear proliferation must be addressed in a balanced manner; double standards should be condemned; universal adherence to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocols should be promoted and nuclear export control systems should be improved. The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be safeguarded and nuclear security measures should be enhanced to prevent accidents and guarantee the safe use of nuclear energy.

78. China had kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for its national security and had never deployed nuclear weapons on foreign territory. It had never taken part in any form of nuclear arms race, and adhered to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time, under any circumstances. It had signed and ratified all existing instruments on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

79. His Government remained committed to dialogue for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and believed that the nuclear issue in the Islamic Republic of Iran should be solved through negotiation. It welcomed the entry into force of the Bangkok Treaty and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and supported the early convening of an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

80. **Mr. Cabactulan** (Philippines) said that failure to convene a conference on a non-nuclear-weapon zone in the Middle East could have very profound implications for the next Review Conference and for the Treaty itself. He called again on the Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as well as the facilitator and the countries of the region to ensure that a conference was held as soon as possible. Continued defiance of the Treaty by States parties would weaken the document as well as efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The persistent threats by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to launch nuclear attacks on the Republic of Korea and the United States were cause for deep concern.

81. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was still awaiting signature and ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by the five nuclear-weapon States. Progress in nuclear disarmament was currently stalled, and prospects were bleak. The only comprehensive and universal path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons was a nuclear weapons convention. An international conference should be held in the near future to set the parameters for the elimination of nuclear weapons and prohibit their production, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and provide for the destruction of such weapons within a specified time frame.

82. **Mr. Aryasinha** (Sri Lanka) said that all three pillars of the Treaty required equal attention. The 13 practical steps to meet disarmament commitments

that had been agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference should be implemented. A transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament was required. In that context, Sri Lanka was committed to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Negotiations must begin at the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for manufacturing nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

83. Recent activities on the Korean Peninsula that violated international law were a reminder of the need for States to move towards the total elimination of and an absolute ban on nuclear arsenals. His Government welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa, and supported the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It was important to convene a conference on that subject as soon as possible.

84. While States parties had the right to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty, they also bore the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and nuclear security. All States should comply with the objectives of IAEA, which should also strengthen its technical cooperation programme to help developing States parties in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

85. **Ms. Ciobanu** (Romania) said that the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference had set a very positive trend for the future of the non-proliferation regime. The future of the Treaty depended on the political will of States parties to achieve its full implementation and universality. Her Government supported all initiatives designed to facilitate the work of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and universal adoption and implementation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols thereto.

86. As a country with a civilian nuclear programme, Romania had demonstrated its respect for the right of each country to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that non-proliferation, safety and security conditions were entirely met. Her delegation regretted the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in 2012, but would continue to support the Secretary-General, the sponsors and the facilitator to convene one as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.